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BOOK REVIEWS 
STAT!S AND NATIONAL PowER OVER CoMMERCJS. By F. D. G. Ribble. 
Foreword by Robert B. Tunstall. New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press. 1937. pp. xii, 266. $3.00. 
This moderate sized volume, to quote the author, "attempts to 
trace the course of constitutional theory with reference to the divi-
sion of power over commerce between the nation and the states." 
Its "purpose is to view the division of power in the present in the 
light of this evolution through the past." Thus, "it is hoped, some 
anom11lies may be explained and aid may be given to a better under-
standing of the law of today." That this purpose has been achieved 
with marked success becomes increasingly apparent as the reader 
makes progress through the pages. 
Beginning with John Marshall and his great opinion in Gibbons 
v. Ogden (a natural and conventional starting point) Professor Rib-
ble examines with careful analysis the exposition of the commerce 
clause from that day to the present. Influenced by eighteenth cen-
tury legal philosophy, the great Chief Justice 'looked at "the nature 
of the power" granted to Congress by the Constitution. Thus in 
any case arising under the commerce clause the important fact was 
whether or not the power exercised was, by its nature, a part of that 
power granted to the federal government. For if it were, then Con-
gress and Congress alone could exercise it; its power was exclusive 
over "commercial intercourse affecting more states than one." 
Strong proponent of federal power as he was, Marshall recognized, 
however, that other parts of the Constitution left to the states pow-
ers, the exercise of which might look like a regulation of commerce 
and which might lead to something approximating the same result. 
Furthermore these reserved powers o£ the states permitted them to 
regulate matters within their borders in such a manner as to "im-
pinge sharply on the conduct of interstate commerce." But to Mar-
shall it was obvious that the power of the states and the power of 
the federal government flowed from different sources. 
Tracing the development of constitutional theory which went hand 
in hand with tl)e tremendous expansion of commerce during the 
nineteenth century, the author points out how Marshall's successor, 
Chief Justice Taney diverged widely from his predecessor. A Jack-
sonian Democrat and theoretically a Jeffersonian, Taney concurred 
in the fund~ental theory of state's rights embraced by his party .. 
Primarily interested in the economic and social welfare of the peo-
ple, he concerned himself with "practical" matters rather than with 
refinements of constitutional theory. As he surveyed the field of 
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commerce he found as a matter of fact that both the federal gov-
ernment and the states were legislating with respect to the same sub-
ject matter. Hence he enunciated the doctrine that the power to 
regulate commerce among the states was one possessed jointly by 
the state and nation. · To this reviewer the author makes it clear that 
had Marshall's concept of "the nature of the power" not suffered 
decline we should have been spared many inconsistencies and anom-
alies in the decisions of the Supreme Court, confusing and even be-
wildering to lawyer and layman alike. Vve would not have been told 
in one breath that the federal power was "exclusive" and almost in 
the ne..'<:t that it was "concurrent." Nor would we have heard so 
much of "direct" and "indirect" burdens on commerce nor of laws 
"regulating'' and "affecting'' it. It is obvious that where one views 
commerce from the standpoint of the "subject of the power" rather 
than the "nature of the power" it must follow that any regulation 
dealing with the subject matter would be a regulation of commerce. 
Thus in the case of Cooley v. The Port TVardens, decided during 
Taney's incumbency, in which state pilotage laws were upheld, the 
doctrine was enunciated that there resided in the states the power 
to regulate interstate and foreign commerce which could be exer-
cised in the absence of a federal statute on the subject as to those 
matters which were local in character and regarding which no uni-
form rule was necessary. A corollary of this doctrine, however, 
recognized that if the regulation were not purely local in character 
but one requiring a uniform rule, silence by Congress was as effec--
tive in preventing state action as a positive congressional mandate. 
Another important theory flowing from the concept of the "sub-· 
ject of the power," as the author points out, was that dealing with 
the physical movement in interstate or foreign commerce. To Mar-
shall, viewing the commerce power from the standpoint of the "na-
ture of the power," the question of physical motion was immaterial. 
But under the influence of the subsequent doctrine we find hair 
splitting legal technicalities employed in the solution of the question 
of whether or not a particular regulation was a regulation of inter-
state or foreign commerce. So long as manufacturing and com-
merce in the United States were relatively simple and an interval 
e..'<:isted between the processing and marketing of goods, the "subject 
of the power" theory with its related concepts of movement· and 
time worked reasonably well. But today manufacture and transpor-
tation frequently form a continuous process, and an attempt to ap-
ply the time and movement theory has resulted in startling niceties 
of distinction. The modern concept of "currents" of commerce 
tends to counteract the effects of the movement and time theory. 
Modern economic forces hardly can be e..'<:pected to consider state 
boundaries other than artificial lines. · 
It seems amazing today that :Marshall's clear and logical exposi-
tion of the Constitution should have been ignored by subsequent ju-
rists. To him it was perfectly apparent that state regulation, al-
though affecting the same subject matter, did not flow from the 
same source. But even the exercise of the reserved power of the 
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states, while affecting the same subject matter, and often approxi-
mating the same end, could not be so employed as to regulate that 
which was vested solely in Congress, even though Congress had is-
sued no mandate. 
Another factor vitally touching federal and state power over com-
merce, discussed by the author, is the due process clause of the fifth 
amendment. Intended as a limitation on congressional power, it was 
understood at first to apply to procedure only. But with time it has 
developed to include substantive rights as well. Where an attempted 
regulation of interstate commerce is deemed highly unreasonable by 
the court, due process of law is said to have been denied. But, as 
the author says, "the more unreasonable the statute, the more diffi-
cult is it to show that the statute is a regulation of interstate com-
merce, particularly where reliance is placed upon economic or prac-
tical relationships." On this theory were the Adair case and the 
Railroad Pension case decided. 
With a long line of decisions which recognized the power of Con-
gress· to prohibit the transportation in interstate commerce of ar-
ticles deemed injurious, the court in the Child Labor case felt bound 
to call a halt. While the author doubts perhaps, that the Court se-
lected the best opportunity for drawing such a line, he "does not 
question the political wisdom of, or the constitutional sanction for, 
drawing a line such as will leave, as of right, some substantial au-
tonomy to the states." It would ·be an unwarranted construction 
which would permit the federal government directly or indirectly to 
absorb all the powers of the states, since everything to· some degree 
is connected with interstate commerce. Under such a construction 
the federal government could legislate as if there were included in 
the Constitution a clause reading "Congress shall have power to 
provide for the general welfare." As the author aptly states, "If, 
in effect, all powers were delegated, the Tenth Amendment is a 
gross delusion." The belief on the part of the Court in varying de-
grees of concurrence ~hat the power to regulate interstate and for-
eign commerce is limited by other parts of the Constitution, is ap-
parent in recent important decisions, notably in the Schechter case 
and the AAA case. 
Although, as the author says, "Unfortunate terminology breeds 
many paradoxes," the Supreme Court has sought "consistency with 
the policy apparent in federal legislation, so far as the Court can 
ascertain that policy." But in attempting to discover this "will of 
Congress," as he states further, "The Court has to guess and in 
guessing it is likely to concede that its wisdom coincides with the 
wisdom of Congress." Despite apparent paradoxical conclusions 
which have been reached because of uncritical definitions and use of 
terms, and conflicting constitutional theories, the author finds a rea-
sonably consistent policy on the part of the Court. The principal 
foundation on which American constitutional law has been built is· 
the adjustment between federal and state power. As the author de-
clares, "It would be .a shocking thing, if state and federal govern-
ments acting together were prevented from achieving the end de-
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sired by both, simply because of the division of power between 
them." But this adjustment between state and nation naturally in-
cludes, in addition to the result desired, a selection of the appropri-
ate medium, national or state. The Court has sought to leave to the 
states those powers· which "can be most advantageously exercised 
by the states themselves," while permitting the federal government 
to control "those things which can be best handled" by it, and those 
"which require unified control," except "where the Court has felt 
that the cost to state autonomy is too great." 
Mr. Ribble, who has held the chair of Constitutional Law at the 
University of Virginia for some years, and who recently has been 
made acting Dean of the Law School, has presented an able, dis-
passionate, and illuminating study of the commerce power. Be-
cause of the relative brevity of his book, at times, perhaps he has 
condensed his material too greatly. This is no serious defect since 
his readers for the most part will ·be persons fairly conversant with 
the field. At most it may result only in one's having to re-read cer-
tain passages to gain their full import. The Table of Cases would 
be more valuable were the citations given also, while in the Table of 
Leading Articles Cited the inclusion of the surname only of the au-
thors tends toward difficulty in identification. This reviewer rec-
ommends this work to all students of the Constitution and congrat-
ulates its author. 
Tm:oooRS S. Cox. 
Williamsburg, Virginia. 
